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Given all the media hoopla over the Supreme Court's recent ap-
proval of racially and sexually defined employment goals and time-
tables,' one would think that a weapon of awesome power and
broad scope had been added to the enforcement arsenal of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC or the Com-
mission]. 2 I am sorry to disappoint you, but the availability of goals
and timetables will not mean the end of employment discrimination.
Goals and timetables, long a popular rallying cry among some who
claim to be concerned with the right to equal employment opportu-
nity, have become a sideshow in the war on discrimination. The vast
majority of all charges of employment discrimination now filed with
the EEOC involve violations for which goals and timetables are not
* Chairman, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. J.D., Yale Law
School, 1974. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily represent EEOC
policy. The Commission is a collegial body, generally composed of five members, which
adopts policies by majority vote. I wish to thank Paul Bogas for his assistance in the
preparation of this article.
1. A "goal" is a numerical target, usually expressed as a percentage, for the hiring or
promotion of persons of a particular group. "Timetables" are the deadlines for reach-
ing the numerical goals. Goals and timetables are sometimes voluntarily adopted, some-
times included in a settlement agreement between an employer and the EEOC, and
sometimes imposed by a court after a finding of discrimination.
2. The Supreme Court's approval of race-conscious relief came in four decisions:
United States v. Paradise, 107 S.Ct. 1053 (1987) (a one-black-for-one-white promotion
requirement for Alabama state troopers, where the state was guilty of a long and shame-
ful record of delay and resistance to a court order to integrate, does not violate the equal
protection clause); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California,
107 S.Ct. 1442 (1987) (a state employer may take gender into account and promote a
woman over a better qualified man where the job category was traditionally segregated
and women were manifestly underrepresented, even though the employer had never
discriminated against women); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 106 S.Ct. 3019
(1986) [hereinafter Local 28] (a 29.23% nonwhite union membership goal, imposed by
court decree after a finding of egregious and longstanding discrimination by a recalci-
trant discriminator, was not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause or Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964); Local 93, Firefighters v. Cleveland, 106 S.Ct. 3063 (1986)
(Title VII does not preclude entry of a consent decree that may benefit individuals who
are not actual victims of an employer's discriminatory practice).
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appropriate as a form of relief. Even in those circumstances where
goals are available as a remedy, there are generally tougher and
more effective alternatives available. Despite my personal disagree-
ment with the Court's approval of numerical remedies, 3 as Chair-
man of the EEOC, I am nevertheless grateful that the legal debate
over goals and timetables has been resolved so that attention can be
focused on the facts and the real issues in the EEOC's battle against
employment discrimination.
L Past Uses of Goals and Timetables
To explain why I consider goals and timetables to be at best a
relatively weak and limited weapon against existing forms of dis-
crimination, I offer some background on the Commission's enforce-
ment efforts. During the mid- and late-1970s, the Commission
concentrated its efforts to enforce Title VII on suits that would af-
fect large numbers of people. The EEOC first obtained authority to
litigate employment discrimination suits under a 1972 amendment
to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 4 At that time, blatant discrimination
was still prevalent. Many employers openly maintained "No
Blacks/Women Need Apply" policies, and many others had moved
such practices underground. Minorities and women were not ad-
vancing into the workforce in as great numbers as many had hoped.
The Commission, confronted with the enormity of the problem
and limitations on its litigation resources, took a "bang for the
buck" approach to fighting discrimination. Although Title VII guar-
anteed individuals the right to be free of discrimination in employ-
ment, the Commission did not attempt to right every wrong
individually, a task for which its litigation machinery was not pre-
pared. Instead, the Commission tried to make quick statistical pro-
gress by funneling resources into challenges against the hiring
practices of some of the country's largest employers. During this pe-
riod, suits were brought against such companies as American Tele-
3. I continue to believe that distributing opportunities on the basis of race or gen-
der, whoever the beneficiaries, turns the law against employment discrimination on its
head. Class preferences are an affront to the rights and dignity of individuals-both
those individuals who are directly disadvantaged by them, and those who are their sup-
posed beneficiaries. I think that preferential hiring on the basis of race or gender will
increase racial divisiveness, disempower women and minorities by fostering the notion
that they are permanently disabled and in need of handouts, and delay the day when skin
color and gender are truly the least important things about a person in the employment
context.
4. Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f) (1981)).
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phone and Telegraph, General Electric, Ford Motor, General
Motors, and Sears Roebuck.
The use of remedies that included racially defined goals and time-
tables was a necessary consequence of the emphasis on this kind of
litigation. Under then-prevailing judicial standards, many of these
cases were based solely on statistical disparities. Frequently, all that
was known was that members of one group were substantially un-
derrepresented in the employer's workforce. It was rarely possible
to say which of the many rejected applicants would have been hired
absent discrimination, since many of the jobs in question required
only unskilled labor and records of unsuccessful job applicants were
incomplete. In such cases, back pay for actual victims was not an
available form of relief. Therefore, the Commission would agree to
settlements or would seek relief under which other members of the
victims' class were given positions as substitutes for those who
would have been employed had nondiscriminatory selection criteria
been used.
This emphasis on "systemic" suits led the Commission to over-
look many of the individuals who came to our offices to file charges
and seek assistance. If an individual's allegations did not involve a
priority issue or apply to other members of a class, the Commission
was unlikely to go to bat for the individual in court.
The Commission has now entered a new stage in its enforcement
work. Although systemic litigation is still an area of emphasis for
the Commission, it no longer need consume our resources to the
exclusion of other types of cases. Many of the very large employers
who once appeared to discriminate have been brought into compli-
ance through lawsuits and Commissioner Charges. 5 Other large and
sophisticated employers, in response to the publicity surrounding
the Commission's efforts, voluntarily changed their discriminatory
practices and sought to remedy the continuing effects of those prac-
tices. Now, for the first time, the Commission has the luxury and
freedom to fight to vindicate the Title VII rights of every individual
victim of discrimination. The Commission has committed itself to a
policy of seeking full relief for every victim of discrimination who
5. In general, the Commission must receive a charge from someone alleging dis-
crimination before an investigation can commence. In special circumstances, however, a
Commissioner may initiate an investigation by filing a charge alleging that an employer
is discriminating unlawfully. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 706(b),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1981). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1601.11. This authority is often
used to investigate the practices of employers whom the Commission suspects of dis-




files a charge. 6 In addition, the Commission has developed and im-
plemented policies designed to make itself more effective in ob-
taining necessary information from uncooperative employers,
thereby speeding along investigations. 7 The new enforcement
stance has already begun to have positive effects. In fiscal year
1986, the Commission filed over five hundred suits-more than ever
before-and this year we are ahead of last year's pace.
It is now more likely that the Commission will be able to identify
the discriminatees entitled to back pay or placement after making a
finding of discrimination in hiring or promotion. Our emphasis on
helping all individuals who come to the Commission's offices with
claims of discrimination means that in most cases we will know who
the victims are. Even many of our larger class action cases are set in
motion by complaints filed by individuals rather than by the obser-
vation of a statistical disparity. Needless to say, the Commission's
ability to produce flesh-and-blood victims is very helpful when we
go to court to prove discrimination.
In addition, most of our cases involve discrimination by a particu-
lar manager or supervisor, rather than a "policy" of discrimination.
Many discriminating employers first responded to Title VII by turn-
ing from explicit policies against hiring minorities and women to
unstated ones. Now even such veiled policies are uncommon; dis-
crimination is left to individual bigots in positions of authority. As a
result, the discrimination that we find today more often has a narrow
impact, perhaps influencing only a few hiring decisions, and does
not warrant the use of a goal that will affect a great number of subse-
quent hires or promotions.
II. Weaknesses of Goals and Timetables
Even in those situations in which goals and timetables are avail-
able, one should not overlook other remedies in the rush to achieve
statistical 'equality. This is not because goals and timetables are too
"tough" a remedy. On the contrary, although group-defined nu-
merical relief is a somewhat imaginative extension of Title VII prin-
ciples, these remedies are fairly easy on employers. In many cases,
there are tougher and more effective remedies available.
6. See Statement of Enforcement Policy, Daily Labor Rep. No. 177, at D-I (Sept. 12,
1984); see also Policy Statement on Remedies and Relief for Individual Cases of Unlawful
Discrimination, Daily Labor Rep. No. 25, at E-1 (Feb. 6, 1985).
7. See Investigative Compliance Policy Statement, Daily Labor Rep. No. 135, at A-9
(July 15, 1986).
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One of the first things I noticed when I came to the Commission
was that often it was the employer who pushed for the use of numer-
ical goals in a settlement agreement. Employers seek such a resolu-
tion even before the Commission has shown that it can identify
actual victims. The reason for this is obvious. In those cases where
numerical relief is possible-that is, where there has been a pattern
or practice of discrimination affecting a large class-every identified
victim has a right to "make whole" relief." Giving back pay to each
actual victim can be quite expensive, but the cost of agreeing to hire
a certain number of blacks or women is generally de minimis. The
employer's expense for "make whole" relief may also include exten-
sive hearings to determine who among rejected applicants would
have been hired. There is, in other words, an economic incentive
for an employer to settle the case before it becomes necessary to
identify actual victims. 9 It should therefore come as no surprise that
large firms such as E.I. Dupont de Nemours, Inc. and Potomac Elec-
tric Co. and groups such as the National Association of Manufactur-
ers were falling over each other to applaud the Court's approval of
affirmative action.' 0 The recent decisions will decrease the chances
that employers will be forced to hire those persons actually discrimi-
nated against (who would be entitled to back pay) and will increase
the probability that employers will escape fully addressing discrimi-
nation by merely hiring a certain number of blacks or women (who
are not entitled to back pay). Moreover, the approval of goals and
timetables allows yet-undetected discriminators to create a numeri-
cal smokescreen for their past or present violations. 1' The use of
affirmative action, rather than a victim-specific form of relief, effec-
tively allows employers to shift the cost of the remedy from them-
selves to the actual victims of their past discrimination, who never
receive the back pay and jobs to which they are entitled, and to the
qualified persons who will be deprived of an employment opportu-
8. See, eg., Kraszewski v. State Farm Ins. Co, 41 FEP Cases 1088 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
9. Courts also yield to the temptation to settle for group relief in order to avoid the
difficult task of determining exactly who the victims are. See, e.g., Segar v. Smith, 738
F.2d 1249, 1289 n.36 and 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985).
10. See Berry & Seaberry, "Firms Praise Affirmative Action Ruling," Washington
Post, Mar. 29, 1987, at HI.
11. Professor Drew Days III, Assistant U.S. Attorney General for Civil Rights during
the Carter Administration, believes that the affirmative action plan in United Steelwork-
ers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), was adopted by Kaiser Aluminum and
Chemical Corp., at least in part, to "divert attention from the fact that it had long been
engaged in discriminatory employment practices that violated federal law." Days, "Ful-
lilove," 96 Yale L.J. 453, 461 (1987). Days notes that previously Kaiser had been forced





nity because someone else was given a preference under the reme-
dial plan.
Goals and timetables are sometimes defended, not as a way of
making up for yesterday's discrimination, but as a way of monitoring
a past discriminator to ensure that he or she is extending an equal
opportunity to today's applicants and employees.' 2 However, once
again, numerical goals are a relatively ineffective way to accomplish
the stated ends. The use of goals to monitor a past discriminator is
based on the assumption that, absent discrimination, members of
various groups would reap the benefits of occupational opportuni-
ties in proportion to their representation in the relevant labor mar-
ket. When the employer begins to hire members of the victimized
group at levels that mirror their availability, it is presumed that dis-
crimination has ceased.
Even granting the dubious assumption that absent discrimination
workforce representation of all groups would precisely mirror their
availability in the workforce, this policy fails because it allows an em-
ployer to hide continuing discrimination behind good numbers. For
example, in Connecticut v. Teal, '3 the Supreme Court found that while
an employer had a good "bottom line" number of black hires, one
component of the selection process nevertheless impermissibly dis-
criminated against minorities. A preference for minorities at some
other point in the process produced hiring that mirrored availabil-
ity, but a discriminatory written test' 4 had been used that unfairly
excluded some blacks from consideration. As a group, blacks re-
ceived their fair share of positions, but the Court recognized that
numerical justice did not eviscerate the right of individual black ap-
plicants to receive nondiscriminatory consideration. This distinc-
tion is not merely abstract. Some better-qualified blacks were
eliminated from consideration by the discriminatory test. Giving
preference to another, less-qualified, black was little consolation to
the qualified person who had been passed over. Moreover, because
some of the better qualified blacks were excluded by the invalid test,
one can expect that black members of the workforce would be less
likely to rise to positions of authority where they could help assure
fair treatment and hiring of others.
12. See, e.g., Local 28, 106 S.Ct. at 3051 (goals are a "benchmark" against which to
gauge whether the employer is now providing equal opportunities). See also Contractors
Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
13. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
14. For purposes of this analysis, I assume that the test was indeed discriminatory.
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In another case, the Commission found that a fire department
that until 1978 had employed no blacks had adopted a policy of re-
serving a number of positions exclusively for black firefighters.' 5
The department held to this quota, and even went so far as to re-
place blacks who left with other blacks, and whites with other whites,
presumably under the impression that this was what was meant by
equal opportunity. However, lurking behind the numbers was con-
tinued discrimination. The blacks hired under the program were
subjected to racial harassment and generally did not advance. One
black firefighter, who resigned after four years with the department,
said that blacks knew they were there "because they need a
quota."' 16 The policy, far from eliminating consideration of race in
the workplace, actually seems to have encouraged the treatment of
blacks as fungible and fundamentally unlike non-blacks.
III, Alternative Enforcement Strategies
Reliance on numerical targets to determine whether a past dis-
criminator has foresworn illegal practices will sometimes lead us to
overlook continuing discrimination. One alternative monitoring
technique would be to require that the employer submit detailed
information on all hiring and promotion decisions. Of course com-
pliance with this requirement is tougher on employers than simply
reporting the number of group members hired, but it also provides
the Commission with more of the information necessary to deter-
mine whether each individual is receiving fair consideration. Evalu-
ating this data would also be more burdensome for the Commission
than merely checking to see that a quota had been met. However, in
my opinion, it is worth the additional effort to have as much infor-
mation as possible about a discriminator's activities. At the very
least, this approach would provide the statistical evidence that is ob-
tained by using a numerical goal, without resort to an explicitly race-
conscious remedy.
Goals are also sometimes extolled for their ability to force a recal-
citrant discriminator into line. 17 There are, however, tougher means
of deterrence. One such approach would be for courts to impose
heavy fines and even jail sentences on discriminators who defy court
injunctions against further discrimination. I am not aware of any
15. See Kurtz, "In N. Carolina Town, Racism Seen as a Daily Reality," Washington
Post, Oct. 22, 1986, at Al.
16. Id. at A10.





case where a court has resorted to such measures, and I must
wonder why they are so reluctant. To those of us who consider em-
ployment discrimination not only unlawful but also a moral abomi-
nation, such measures are altogether fitting.
Another way to stop a recalcitrant discriminator would be for a
court to hand over control of an employer's personnel operations to
a special master. The special master would handle personnel deci-
sions such as hiring and promotion, and we could be certain that
discrimination would be discontinued immediately. The use of spe-
cial masters is provided for by Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and special masters have been used with great success in
some school desegregation cases.18 Wresting personnel decisions
from the employer would be tougher and more effective than using
the quotas of which employers are so fond.
The courts have also occasionally looked to goals as a means of
eliminating the continuing effects of past discrimination.19 By this is
meant two things: first, an employer's reputation for discrimination
may discourage members of the victimized group from applying,
even after the employer stops discriminating; 20 and second, the re-
sults of past discrimination may cause a facially neutral recruitment
or selection procedure to adversely affect persons on the basis of
race or sex. An example of the latter would occur where past dis-
criminatory hiring practices had produced an all-white workforce,
which was then perpetuated both by the employer's facially neutral
policy of giving hiring preferences to family members of current em-
ployees and by a recruitment program consisting largely of referrals
from current employees.
Although hiring goals are offered as a solution to this problem,
they do not directly address it. Numerical targets are expected to
encourage the employer to adopt other facially neutral means of re-
cruitment and hiring that will more rapidly lead to integration of the
workforce. However, the tougher and more direct approach would
be for the Commission to seek specific changes in recruitment and
hiring practices. In the example above, a court could require the
employer to eliminate the family member preference and place
"help wanted" ads in media outlets that reach members of the previ-
18. See, e.g., Hart v. Community School Bd. of Brooklyn, 383 F. Supp. 699, 758-69
(E.D.N.Y. 1974) (appointing a special master and providing a brief history of the use of
special masters by courts).
19. See, e.g., Local 28, 106 S.Ct. at 3050.
20. See, e.g., International Brotherhood ofTeamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
365 (1977) (recognizing that a history of discrimination can deter potential applicants).
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ously excluded group. Employers naturally prefer numerical goals
that leave the particulars of how those goals are to be reached to
their discretion. As in Teal, many employers will no doubt choose a
quick fix that meets the target without actually purging discrimina-
tion from the process. By seeking specific changes in recruitment
and hiring practices, however, the Commission could ensure the in-
stitution of a self-perpetuating fair process, not just the several years
worth of "equal" results that a quota would yield.
Proponents of affirmative action also argue that goals offer a way
to compensate for socially created "headwinds" against achieve-
ment by certain groups. For example, many blacks attended schools
that were denied the resources provided to schools that whites at-
tended, and many women were shepherded away from analytic cur-
ricula. Hiring targets are said to be a way to make up for these
disadvantages, or headwinds, created by prior discrimination. One
problem with this approach, as Professor Drew Days has noted, is
that concentrating on societal discrimination rather than the dis-
crimination by a particular institution "discourages the search for
evidence of past discriminatory practices and for remedies tailored
to rectify that discrimination. '" 2'
Moreover, there are more effective and direct ways of addressing
the problem. To the extent that some have been unfairly deprived
of education, training, and other advantages, the obvious solution is
to provide training and education to those who have gone without.
Rather than offer the individuals pity or handouts, we should pro-
vide them with the tools that may allow them to help themselves.
The need for remedial education and training is especially urgent as
widespread technological advances and the shift from a manufactur-
ing to a services-based economy increasingly affect the em-
ployability of the unskilled. 22 In the future, proper skills will be so
important that employment preferences will not be able to compen-
sate for their absence. Moreover, to whatever extent we do want to
give preferences to compensate those who have been unfairly de-
prived of certain advantages, we should do so in a manner that is
just. Any preferences given should be directly related to the obsta-
21. Days, supra note 11, at 458 n.21.
22. A study completed by the EEOC in 1986 indicated that as Americans experience
widespread technological advances and the shift from a manufacturing to a services-
based economy, training will become an increasingly essential part of providing realistic
equal opportunities. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Project
2000: Job and Training Opportunities for Minorities and Women (1986) (on file with




cles that have been unfairly placed in those individuals' paths, rather
than on the basis of race or gender, or on other characteristics that
are often poor proxies for true disadvantage.
23
Conclusion
The legal debate over affirmative action, which has so long and so
bitterly divided those who are concerned with civil rights, is behind
us, and there is now an opportunity for cooperation and progress.
As we begin, I would like to caution again that numerically based
affirmative action is the easy, but rarely the best, solution. Goals
and timetables are easy on employers who want to avoid back pay
liability and easy on interest groups that are more concerned with
advancing group interests than with the rights of particular individu-
als. They are especially easy on the Commission in that they offer a
remedy that requires no lengthy investigation to identify actual vic-
tims, no task of crafting specific changes in an employer's practices,
and no burden of evaluating reams of records. Unfortunately, the
use of numerical goals is tough on those actual victims of discrimi-
nation who are never identified or compensated and on those vic-
tims down the line for whom filling a quota never quite adds up to a
truly equal opportunity. The temptation to do things the easy way is
always great, but before we succumb we should remember these vic-
tims, and then choose the tougher course that promises to yield
genuine and lasting equal opportunities.
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23. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 320-48 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that law schools evaluate applicants' prior achievements in light of any barri-
ers they faced).
